Classes suspended today (July 27, 2011)

Malacanang already announced suspension of classes today due to typhoon. We'll meet on Friday. Please be guided accordingly. Thanks!

Attention Everyone

Please watch the State of the Nation Address of Pres. Noynoy Aquino on TV today. Thanks!

Oligarchic control of the state By Tony Lopez

Manila Times

July 19, 2011

Oligarchic control of the state

By Tony Lopez

THREE weeks ago, upon the invitation of economist Bernie Villegas, I attended a seminar on structural reform at the University of Asia and the Pacific.

The consensus after four hours of discussion is that there is need to amend the Constitution to open up the economy and allow a greater inflow of foreign investments to push the country’s economic development.

The view of the participants is that there are just too many areas closed to foreigners. The restrictions were imposed in the 1935 Constitution and which were carried forward into the 1973 and 1987 Constitution.

As a result of these restrictions, the economy has remained in the stranglehold of the country’s entrenched oligarchies and power brokers. There are no more than 100 families controlling the politics and business of this country.

Five of the six largest commercial banks are all privately owned, by oligarchs. The six banks control more than 70 percent. The five largest private banks are: No. 1 BDO owned by retailing and property magnate Henry Sy Sr. (the richest Filipino); No. 2 Metrobank owned by auto and property tycoon George SK Ty; No. 3 Bank of PI owned by the banking, telco and real estate conglomerate Ayala Corp. chaired by Jaime Augusto Zobel de Ayala; No. 5 RCBC of industrialist-philanthropist Al Yuchengco; and PNB of tobacco and property mogul Lucio Tan (the second richest Filipino).

These bank owners are among the 15 richest individuals in the country. Sadly, they are not exactly among the 15 largest individual taxpayers.

Two-bit actors and radio-tv personalities pay more taxes than they do.

With just P331.5 billion of equity, the five largest private banks control P3.29 trillion or 51 percent of total banking industry resources, P2.5 trillion or 53 percent of total system deposits, and P1.52 trillion or 58 percent of total commercial banking loans. The owners of these banks multiplied every peso ten times in terms of banking resources, 7.5 times in terms of deposits and 4.5 times in terms of loans.

If you are or have been a small businessman you will know just how difficult to obtain loans from these banks. The practice reminds you of Shylock.

“We’re still an oligarchy run by a few families,” says Senator Manny Villar, the first Filipino brown billionaire. “They (the oligarchs) are happy with the present setup now and they will not allow the Constitution to be tampered with.”

“The media, from what I’ve seen, is also controlled by groups that do not want to change the Constitution,” the former Senate president adds. “And that is why any proposal (to amend the Constitution) will be killed right away.”

Villar notes the difficulties encountered by small entrepreneurs in growing their business.

“We always look at foreign investments but we don’t look at the local, the small entrepreneurs, who are unable to borrow, unable to access credit because our banking system is controlled by five or six families and they are happy investing in ROPs (government debt papers) or lending to big industries,” the senator relates. “Right now that is our banking system—it’s a cartel and it’s getting fewer and bigger through consolidation.”

Reform is needed in a nation of 95 million (the 12th largest population in the world), a country where one of every four families is certifiably poor, where 70 percent of the wealth is owned by only the top two percent of the population, where both unemployment and underemployment are massive and beyond mitigation, where economic growth in the 25 years before 2005 was the slowest in the world (bar none), where both the Muslim separatist and communist insurgencies are the longest running in the world, and where taxpayers (including the richest people and largest corporations of the land) are congenitally disposed to evade or not pay taxes.

In his paper at the Center for Research and Communication seminar on structural change July 1 at the University of Asia and the Pacific, former National Security Adviser Jose T. Almonte enumerated some of the reforms.

Almonte suggests increasing the pay of government workers. Their pay is 60 percent below market rates, he notes. “This practically encourages officials holding great discretionary powers but take home so little pay to sell favors to their clients,” he points.

“We must raise the standards of openness in all public transactions. And we need to put more teeth in our Ombudsman institution. Right now, corruption is a ‘high-reward, low-risk’ offense,” Almonte urges.

“Far too many branches of our police and justice system are inefficient or even corrupt. Access to the courts is difficult and costly, and decisions are sometimes arbitrary,” he noted.

Also the ‘no-reelection’ clause (for a sitting president)—together with the procedural difficulties of impeachment—in effect places the President beyond the reach of the popular judgment. “I would prefer a President with two four-year terms,” Almonte winces.

He suggests a truly autonomous Commission on Elections —“by vesting it with its own status and resources, enabling it to computerize its facilities, and empowering it to regulate party finances and access to the media.”

Almonte insists on “developing a stable two-party system. At last count, we had 162 separate parties registered with the COMELEC—but with none large enough and coherent enough to make public policy.”

He thinks “switching to the parliamentary system might in fact help institutionalize our parties, and make the centralization of political power easier to organize, it will also rid us of the protectionist provisions that prevent the entry of foreign capital into key sectors of our economy.”

On another front, Almonte says “if we are to begin redressing the balance of our lopsided economy, we must make countryside development a centerpiece of public policy. And the bulk of our spending in human capital, we must shift to our most disadvantaged regions in a kind of affirmative action.”

Finally, Almonte complains, “the very center of the State itself has been captured by the national oligarchy.”

“Interest groups have such effective control of the State machinery that rule making and enforcement serve not the general welfare but particular interests,” he says.

“Oligarchic influence on the highest State organs enables powerful individuals, families, and clans to tilt the rules of competition in their favor —and acquire privileged access to the rents and commissions generated by public investments.”

In the Defense of Elitism

Elitism has been viewed in two differing lights as either "inevitable and desirable" or "remediable and regrettable" (Heywood, 2007, 83). For advocates of modern democratic rule, the latter contention is particularly resonant. After all, democracy was founded on the idea that all are born equal with natural rights and thus should be free from the arbitrary rule of the few.

However, these same theorists (Hobbes and Locke) also prescribe that we surrender some of these rights to a sovereign to escape the state of nature. Whether by necessity or by convenience, these same scholars acknowledge that a smaller group should exercise power in a society, as expounded upon by scholars such as Michels and Mosca. This smaller group, as C. W. Mills puts it, form the power elite that shapes the trajectory of a nation's policies. While modern democrats advocate checks on this power elite through representative government and separation of powers as advocated by Locke, the fact remains that in modern democracies, as in the autocracies that democracy was pioneered to replace, power is still exercised by a small group.

There are few escapes from the "iron law of oligarchy" as Michels puts it. One would be direct democracy closer to what was envisioned by the Athenians who pioneered classical democracy wherein all citizens would participate in governing, commonly done through plebiscites and referendums in modern times. However, this means of governing has drawbacks in terms of practicability (What mechanism can be used to allow all citizens of a state to participatey?) and convenience (Would people participate in governing if this took time away from their labor or leisure?).

The other escape would be anarchy, or the absence of the state, which brings us back to the state of nature and whether existence in a society is possible without government or would life be "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." Interestingly, Marx believed that through the "withering away of the state" people would be able to live harmoniously in the absence of the state, albeit through the heavy hand of the state during the period of the "dictatorship of the proletariat." Still, no socialist state has reached the communist mode of production leading many to rethink Marx's "withering away of the state."

For the most part, it would seem that the rule of the few has more or less been accepted in mainstream political discourse. If the formation of political elites is unavoidable, then what separates democracies from autocracies is not whether the few or the many rule, but the ability of the people to constrain the power of the ruler, often manifested in electoral rules mandated by a constitution. This would be what prevents the formation of Aristotle's "perverted" government (rule for the ruler) and foster "natural" government (rule for all).

Thus, elitism per se should probably not be antagonized as only unchecked elite rule is detrimental to society. In our case, elites for the most part have proven to be non-cohesive with a large number of them implementing unpredictable policies, exercising unchecked power, and possessing unclear motives...

Oh well...

Reference

Heywood, A. (2007). Politics (3^rd ed.). New York: Palgrave Macmillan

The Trappings of Democracy: How the Power Elite is Necessary to its Stability

Minimalists prefer to conceptualize democracy as limited to elections.Those who adopt the conception of democracy as entailing both equality and equity, however, would probably be initially surprised at research that juxtapose two seemingly contradicting concepts: democratic stability and the presence of a unified power elite.

Of course, Przeworski's (1991) definition of democratic consolidation already dispels the original impression that there is a disjunction between the two concepts. That democracy, to be consolidated, must be considered as "the only game in town" necessitates the consent of all sectors of society that democracy is the best form of rule -- or, at least, that the military don't take over a hotel in Ayala or that the incumbent doesn't exercise an executive coup d'etat. Other social groups that have the capacity to overturn the democratic system wouldn't do so in a consolidated democracy. Our interest in social groups extends to the business sector, where most of the economic elite have some ties, whether familial or platonic, with the power elite; sometimes, they might even be one and the same. C. Wright Mills (1956) asserts this by arguing that the power elite are "in command of... major hierarchies... they rule big corporations [and] run the machinery of the state".

How else is the stability of a democracy preserved? Sartori (1987) proposes that it occurs when the overall perception of the power elite (that is, the popularly elected, regardless of the actual cleanliness of the entire election) is that democracy produces positive outcomes -- or, at least, that majority rule exists in the decision-making process. Higley, Hoffman-Lange, Kadushin and Moore (1991) explain this phenomenon as possible because committees "interact... on the basis of consessions or 'side payments' that they make to each other". Insert that in Congress and the effect is magnified because of our concept of utang na loob. And all this is justifiable because it is the genuine desires of the people that they represent!

(As a side note, it's no wonder that it works out that way; Coronel (2004) emphasizes that the personalistic aspect of our politics is a mirror of our political culture, and thus strengthens the elite characteristic of politics. To whom do we leave the decision-making to? To individual politicians. And whose interests do they advance? Presumably the electorate's, but seeing a former schoolmate parade around her shiny new -- possibly smuggled? -- car that her Mayor father couldn't afford on his own government-sanctioned income makes one wonder. But I digress.)

Higley, et al. (1991), in a study about the American, Australian and German elite structures (all of which are considered mature democracies), conclude that there is a "funnel-like structure of elite communication... inclusive of all elite sectors and heterogenous in... origins, [issue] attitudes, and [party] affiliations" and that it is "in line with... elite inclusiveness... in stable democracies". Higley, et al., acknowledge, however, that it is arguable that political stability would be synonymous to democratic stability, with a significantly smaller portion of the population dominating the political arena. Taking Diamond’s definition of an expanded procedural notion of democracy would entail that the procedures of the democratic regime must be more accessible would lambast that view.

There is also the problem that these findings do not necessarily apply to the Philippines. One could argue, as a point in case, that our political parties are pragmatic rather than programmatic, as the political parties in these areas are, so the theory can't be applicable in our context. You could even adopt the stance that we are oligarchic rather than democratic, and we haven't been democratically consolidated, two-turnover test or not.

As for more extensive theories on the subject, Higley and Burton (1989) enumerate several cases wherein democratic transitions proved to be unsuccessful without the unification of the elite. Latin America has the relatively recent examples, from Colombia, Velenzuela, Chile and Uruguay, all of which experienced democratic breakdowns whose instability stemmed from "fragile coalitions and stalemates among... disunified elites... [whose] duration [is dependent] on... luck" (Higley and Burton, 1989). Elite disunity and government breakdowns in general exist as far back as 19th century Europe, with Norway, Spain, France, Italy, Denmark and Belgium experiencing such a crisis. Higley and Burton (1989) that stability exists only after "elite settlement or a two-step transformation", if not from a colonial legacy. Too bad our colonial legacy preserved a warped form of democracy shaped around client-patron relationships and rent-seeking.

As far as the measure of our democratic nature is going, we seem to be headed to the direction of hollowing out, if not being already there. It doesn't seem as if the elite are doing much to preserve the stability of democracy; the preservation of their interests is clearly above that, in spite of their numerous speeches regarding the value of democracy and what-not. The preservation of democratic stability would require a radical change in our political culture, perhaps, but in the absence of it, the most we can hope for is political stability in general.

- Nina Palisoc

References:
Coronel, S. (2004). The rulemakers: How the wealthy and well-born dominate congress. Quezon City: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism.

Higley, J., and Burton, M. (1989). The elite variable in democratic transitions and breakdowns. American Sociological Review 54 (1): 17-32.

Higley, J., Hoffman-Lange, U., Kadushin, C., and Moore, G. (1991). Elite integration in stable democracies: A reconsideration. European Sociological Review 7 (1): 35-53.

Mills, C. (1956). The power elite. New York: Oxford University Press.

Przeworski, A. (1991). Democracy and the market. Political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Sartori, G. (1987). The theory of democracy revisited 1: The contemporary debate. New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers.

The Costs to the Church by Randy David

This is an article taken from the inquirer, published July 9, 2011.

Although the Church draws its mandate from God, it remains very much a human institution. Its leaders are human beings like the rest of us, subject to the same desires and temptations that besiege ordinary mortals. Its structures likewise mirror the characteristics of the society in which it operates. But, as a religious institution, the Church offers a vision that transcends the world of the here and now.  It prescribes a mode of living based on faith that is different from, and at times opposed to, what is common or conventional. Herein resides its distinct societal role. This role is what is undermined when its leaders act like ordinary politicians or businessmen, seeking power or peddling influence, or trading for profit.

No one could have defined this role better for the Catholic Church than its present pope, Benedict XVI. He said: “The Church is an advocate of justice and of the poor, precisely because she does not identify with politicians or with partisan interests. Only by remaining independent can she teach the great criteria and inalienable values, guide consciences and offer a life choice that goes beyond the political sphere. To form consciences, to be the advocate of justice and truth, to educate in individual and political virtues: that is the fundamental vocation of the Church in this area.” (Opening address to the 5th General Conference of the Bishops of Latin America and the Caribbean, May 13. 2007)

The Church would have a problem fulfilling this vocation unless it can command moral authority. The burden of maintaining that authority rests with all its members, but obviously it falls heaviest on its clergy. They are the models of the “life choice” that Benedict talks about, the living examples of what it means to be a human being who chooses to live as Jesus Christ showed and taught.

A priest who becomes a regular fixture in cockpits, for instance, has no business talking about the evils of gambling. Bishops and priests who routinely take money from gambling lords and contributions from state gambling agencies cannot expect to be taken seriously when they rail against the immorality of gambling. Bishops, who have no compunction about asking for a birthday gift from a president, or from any politician for that matter, lose not just their self-respect but also their independence. And, worse, if they pledge their unwavering support to their benefactor in return, they thereby transform the Church they represent into “a directly political subject.” Their actions and pronouncements on crucial issues henceforth become suspect.

One only has to look at the advocacies of the Catholic Church in the Philippines to realize what it gives up when its moral authority is under fire. Apart from its crusade against gambling—a component of its campaign to protect the poor—the Church has been active in at least three other areas. These are: agrarian reform, human rights and reproductive health.

The struggle for agrarian reform and human rights has long been the linchpin of the Philippine Church’s social justice agenda. It is what radicalized members of the religious community during the years of the dictatorship, driving many priests, nuns and seminarians to take up overtly political roles in the underground movement. The collapse of the dictatorship and the advent of the Cory presidency substantially muted this struggle. A property-owning Church that maintained a cozy relationship with the landed elite somehow could not summon the same passion that had fueled the activism of its young clergy. Similarly, a Church that shielded its own priests accused of sexually abusing children from prosecution became wary about criticizing a military that protected human rights violators within its ranks. More than this, it made it difficult for the Church to be taken seriously when it preached the ethics of sexuality.

This crisis of credibility unavoidably spills over to other issues in which the Church has waged a critical battle—not the least of which is the campaign against artificial contraception. Here, public opinion is at least divided, and the Church is aware that it faces an uphill battle. In contrast to the active support that the Church got from former President Gloria Arroyo, it must now contend with an administration that has explicitly taken a position in favor of promoting responsible parenthood, including the use of artificial contraceptives. Rather than seek a common ground in which public policy might be reconciled with moral doctrine, some key leaders of the Church have taken an antagonistic stance towards the presidency of Noynoy Aquino. After failing in their use of moral suasion, which worked on the late President Cory Aquino, some vociferous prelates have begun calling for his resignation.

In the wake of recent revelations of how the funds of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office were raided by Ms Arroyo to reward her favorite politicians and bishops, the Church’s position on many contentious issues becomes less persuasive. The growing public perception is that some bishops have behaved badly. And, while it is true that every bishop is autonomous in his own diocese, one cannot ignore the fact that the Church’s influence is today mainly felt through the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines.

Unless the CBCP can discipline its own members, it risks eroding what residual force is left in its collective pastoral statements. This erosion will have tremendous consequences, good and bad, not only for the religious sphere, but for the whole society.

Face to Face: Elite Edition

It's interesting to note that while the people behind today's media are the elites, we can't really see them there. In my BC134 class which is Public Affairs Broadcasting, we briefly touched on the subject of elites.

As what has been and is being inculcated in our minds since time immemorial, we have a pyramid like income distribution structure, wherein only a few comprises the top. If you want to attract advertisers, you should think about what the "mass" wants. This is reflected in by today's media whose content is full of shows that media practitioners deem can interest the mass.

What is interesting here, however, is that some shows which are deemed "public service programs" which is ideally for the "public good" exploits the mass rather than helps them. An example of which may be TV5's Face to Face.

It's purpose is to reconcile parties with them airing out their grievances in the show. Elites behind these shows claiming that it exist for the public good are doing nothing other than poke fun at common people and get revenue through ads from them.

The question here is: "Why are the elites invisible in today's media?" By elites here, I'm referring to Ayalas, Pangilinans, etc. Is it really because of ratings or is there other reasons like maybe hegemony? Or is it another way to show their difference with the common tao?

I highly doubt Henry Sy, Lopez, or even Pangilinan even watch Face to Face. From this perspective, they seem more like puppeteers with the media as their box. On second thought, they seem more like the people paying the puppeteers.

Wouldn't it be nice to see them in the airwaves as the puppets for a change? I, for one, would definitely watch Henry Sy and Manny Pangilinan battle it out in face to face. Ano kayang gagawin nila? Magsasampalan ng pera? Anong title nung episode? Maybe something on the lines of Face to Face episode titles like "Tortang Talong Menudo" or "Jowa ko inagaw ng bading"

Beyond Liberation Theology

By Roseanne Ramirez [2008-10910]

Secularization theories are not theories of religious decline. This came as a surprise to me when I first read about them, since to me the word always conveyed the dying of religion, or at the very least the relegation of the same. But it is about the increasingly dynamic interaction of the religious and the secular. The continuing institutional differentiation between them led Pieper and Young to claim that we are now living in the age of “Post-Secular” Politics – but I’m getting ahead of myself.

“Secularization,” Pieper and Young write, “understood as the differentiation of religious and temporal institutional authority, is a not myth but a real historical process or set of processes, processes characteristic of modernity.” (2010: 349)

Reinhold Niebuhr provides five frameworks by which to analyze the interaction between religion and secularization. Of particular significance to my discussion is the category “Religion as the Transformer of the Secular.” It is when the religious response to secularization is transvaluation, essentially evaluating old ideas using new standards or principles. It is best represented by something we touched upon in class: Liberation Theology.

Liberation theology was introduced in 1973 by Gustavo Gutierrez, a Peruvian Roman Catholic priest. “It is a school of thought among Latin American Catholics according to which the Gospel of Christ demands that the church concentrate its efforts on liberating the people of the world from poverty and oppression.” (Global Christians, n.d.)

It is “at once an example of religion as powerful agent of cultural transformation, and also a site of multiple contestation between radical clergy, their orthodox superiors, and an increasingly oppressive state.” (Pieper and Young, 2010: 358) Even though they were discussing this in the context of Latin America, it’s not difficult to relate the description to the Philippine situation during Martial Law.

The principle behind Liberation Theology was quite simple. After the Second Vatican Council there emerged a new political reading of the Gospel which interpreted the “People of God” as “Poor People,” who had Christ as their emancipator… From their current economic and social conditions. It’s basically Catholic Faith dancing the waltz with Marxist Theory. They were focusing on things that one wouldn’t expect the Church to focus on (because weren’t we supposed to live in poverty after all?).

In the Philippines, Liberation Theology played a large part in deposing the infamous Ferdinand Marcos. “It is well known, for example, that the Catholic Church, at both the official and lay level, supported the People Power movement in the Philippines in the mid-1980s, providing crucial material and moral resources for the Marcos opposition.” (Zunes, 1999) Father Conrado Balweg of the Society of the Divine Word is perhaps the most famous of the radical clergy, but there were a number of priests and nuns who joined the New People’s Army.

As discussed in class, the Church was caught between a rock and a crazy place. They were torn between wanting to end Martial Law, but what if the communist party took over once the dictator was overthrown? Under the leadership of Cardinal Sin, they took the stance of “critical coordination.”

Well we all know the conclusion of Martial Law turned out to be incredibly favorable for the Church.

Liberation Theology (and the ecclesial base communities) declined in the 1980s when it was suppressed by the Vatican and when the Protestant competition grew strong enough to overshadow it. In Latin America, it gave way to the politics of accommodation. That is to say that Latin American Catholics and Protestants “accommodated their religious values and visions to the increasingly pervasive logic of pragmatic politics and bureaucratic methods.” (Pieper and Young, 2010: 360)

In the Philippines, we seem to have taken a different track. The Catholic Church and the secular forces continue to be in a constant tug of war, while other players have entered the field such as the Iglesia ni Cristo who are said to much more significant as far as political clout is concerned. It will be interesting to see how this plays out, especially since there have been more and more challenges to orthodox beliefs in light of “modernization.” Our debates on the RH Bill, on divorce laws, and on same-sex marriage will definitely change the dynamics between Church and State. So far, the CBCP has taken a very active stance, even threatening to initiate civil disobedience. Are we headed towards a setup where religion is versus the secular? Your guess is as good as mine.

References:

Global Christians (n.d.) “Liberation Theology: General Information” retrieved from http://www.globalchristians.org/politics/2/Liberation%20Theology.pdf on 8 July 2011.

Pieper, C. and Young, M. (2010) “Religion and Post-secular Politics” in Leicht, K. and Jenkins, J.C. (eds.) Handbook of Politics: State and Society in Global Perspective (New York, Dordrecht, Heidelberg and London: Springer), pp. 349–365.

Zunes, Stephen (1999) “The Origin of People Power in the Philippines.” In Nonviolent Social Movements: A Geographical Perspective. Edited by Stephen Zunes, Lester R. Kurtz, and Sarah Beth Asher. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.

UNCOVERING OF THE KATIPUNAN

Sir mentioned (and even most of the history books do) that it was Teodoro Patiño who revealed the existence of the Katipunan. However, I’ve read an article which stated that it was Andres Bonifacio himself that directed Patiño to divulge the society’s existence. Bonifacio wanted to hasten the Philippine revolution and block any doubt or opposition from its members so he ordered Patiño to do so.

Classmates, I would like to hear your side on whether there’s a possibility of Bonifacio revealing the existence of the KATIPUNAN.

thank you

:)

Rizal's Refusal: An Alternative Explanation*

By Roseanne Ramirez [2008-10910]

During a lecture on enlightenment philosophy two semesters ago, I learned about the Philosophes du Salon, based in Paris and Barcelona, and marveled at the lives of those men (I use the term consciously, there were apparently no women among them). It was a powerful movement; the Age of Reason could perhaps be encapsulated in the Immanuel Kant quote, “Dare to know.” But I am bringing it up because it could provide an alternative explanation for why Jose Rizal, and perhaps even the other Spanish-educated Ilustrados, did not want to join the Katipunan.

During our class discussion with Professor Nemenzo, the explanation was simple and logical: the Ilustrados were landowners who had their own interests in keeping the status quo; they were also unwilling to join the superstitious, uneducated peasantry in their plight for a more equal society. This is a good explanation, but there could be another one.

Enlightenment philosophy was the product of a movement of intellectuals in continental Europe, drawing on the assumption that men (sic) are reasonable. That there should be rule by consent, that legal order was the most important aspect of society, that the rule of law is higher than the rule of man. It was the time of the vilification of friars, of the rise of Science as truth, of the freethinkers and the liberals through the Masonic Movement. Their claim to enlightenment was knowledge based on experience (due in large part to the contribution of Locke and the concept of tabula rasa), and they valued government by representation. This was, at the time, a subversive idea.

“The philosophes were united in support of tolerance, the rule of law, social welfare, and secular education, and in their hostility to privilege. They were not, however, opposed to the state as such: They viewed it as a crucial instrument for the realization of their ideals, as long as the ruler respected reason and natural law. Especially in central Europe and Italy, Enlightenment thinkers were more interested in strengthening the state so that it could do its job properly than in limiting its power. The main targets of their hatred were the church and the nobility.” (M.E., 2007)

Among the Paris Philosophes was Francois Marie “Voltaire” Aroeut. He fought against the monarchy and religious tyranny but rejected violent means of gaining political control. Like other enlightenment theorists he thought that it was not the path towards genuine representation. And then I remember distinctly what my professor said after that: Rizal was a lot like Voltaire in repudiating revolution because it is contrary to liberal democratic thought.

Let us, for a moment, give Jose Rizal the benefit of the doubt. What if he was acting not according to his elite interests but within the framework of liberal democracy? I thought this explained his, and maybe even the other Ilustrados', reluctance to join the Katipunan. It was not because of superciliousness or condescension but a matter of principle. Idealistic principle, but beyond personal interests nonetheless. There was after all a resurgence of enlightenment theory in the nineteenth century. I am inclined to believe that as the educated (possibly over-educated) minority, they would have been completely immersed in this European way of thinking and as a consequence desired to achieve freedom in a non-violent, non-revolutionary way. This explanation also fits in with their objective to gain representation in the Spanish courts instead of desiring independence. Ideology is a powerful tool, and it could have easily structured their judgment.

Ironically, the brand of enlightened reason espoused by the Philosophes du Salon temporarily became irrelevant because of an event it triggered in the first place: The French Revolution. But Jean Jacques Rousseau and the fervent Jacobins are fascinating stories for another time and place.

By refusing to join the Katipunan and the bloody revolution it entailed, was Rizal upholding his own elite interests or adhering to liberal democratic thought? I am uncertain which account is more accurate but I am partial towards the latter. I am unwilling to discount the role of ideas and ideology just yet.

*Written based on notes from Political Science 193: Modern Political Thought

PS: A sophomore currently taking Kas 1 told me that the explanation given to them was that the Ilustrados thought it was a valiant idea but their resources were far too little to make any difference. What do you guys think?

Reference:

"Age of Enlightenment." Microsoft® Encarta® 2007 [CD]. Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation, 2006.

Jose P. Laurel: a Collaborator?

Hello classmates! Since we are discussing elites during the Japanese Occupation, I would like to ask your opinions regarding former President Jose P. Laurel who has been dubbed as a "war collaborator" during his administration. Apparently, there are some historians who are insisting that he was not the same as others who collaborated with the Japanese for profit. It was said that Laurel was given instructions by Pres. Manuel Quezon and Gen. Douglas MacArthur to remain in Manila and take charge of the civilian government. There are some chapters in history books such as "Test of Wills: Diplomacy between Japan and the Laurel Government" by Prof. Ricardo Jose portraying President Laurel as recalcitrant and uncooperative with the Japanese which led them to turn to the Makapili. Also, Laurel was shown to have pushed for diplomacy despite the war.

In light of these readings, I would like to hear what you think about whether branding Jose P. Laurel as a "puppet president" in elementary and high school text books is accurate.