The Trappings of Democracy: How the Power Elite is Necessary to its Stability

Minimalists prefer to conceptualize democracy as limited to elections.Those who adopt the conception of democracy as entailing both equality and equity, however, would probably be initially surprised at research that juxtapose two seemingly contradicting concepts: democratic stability and the presence of a unified power elite.

Of course, Przeworski's (1991) definition of democratic consolidation already dispels the original impression that there is a disjunction between the two concepts. That democracy, to be consolidated, must be considered as "the only game in town" necessitates the consent of all sectors of society that democracy is the best form of rule -- or, at least, that the military don't take over a hotel in Ayala or that the incumbent doesn't exercise an executive coup d'etat. Other social groups that have the capacity to overturn the democratic system wouldn't do so in a consolidated democracy. Our interest in social groups extends to the business sector, where most of the economic elite have some ties, whether familial or platonic, with the power elite; sometimes, they might even be one and the same. C. Wright Mills (1956) asserts this by arguing that the power elite are "in command of... major hierarchies... they rule big corporations [and] run the machinery of the state".

How else is the stability of a democracy preserved? Sartori (1987) proposes that it occurs when the overall perception of the power elite (that is, the popularly elected, regardless of the actual cleanliness of the entire election) is that democracy produces positive outcomes -- or, at least, that majority rule exists in the decision-making process. Higley, Hoffman-Lange, Kadushin and Moore (1991) explain this phenomenon as possible because committees "interact... on the basis of consessions or 'side payments' that they make to each other". Insert that in Congress and the effect is magnified because of our concept of utang na loob. And all this is justifiable because it is the genuine desires of the people that they represent!

(As a side note, it's no wonder that it works out that way; Coronel (2004) emphasizes that the personalistic aspect of our politics is a mirror of our political culture, and thus strengthens the elite characteristic of politics. To whom do we leave the decision-making to? To individual politicians. And whose interests do they advance? Presumably the electorate's, but seeing a former schoolmate parade around her shiny new -- possibly smuggled? -- car that her Mayor father couldn't afford on his own government-sanctioned income makes one wonder. But I digress.)

Higley, et al. (1991), in a study about the American, Australian and German elite structures (all of which are considered mature democracies), conclude that there is a "funnel-like structure of elite communication... inclusive of all elite sectors and heterogenous in... origins, [issue] attitudes, and [party] affiliations" and that it is "in line with... elite inclusiveness... in stable democracies". Higley, et al., acknowledge, however, that it is arguable that political stability would be synonymous to democratic stability, with a significantly smaller portion of the population dominating the political arena. Taking Diamond’s definition of an expanded procedural notion of democracy would entail that the procedures of the democratic regime must be more accessible would lambast that view.

There is also the problem that these findings do not necessarily apply to the Philippines. One could argue, as a point in case, that our political parties are pragmatic rather than programmatic, as the political parties in these areas are, so the theory can't be applicable in our context. You could even adopt the stance that we are oligarchic rather than democratic, and we haven't been democratically consolidated, two-turnover test or not.

As for more extensive theories on the subject, Higley and Burton (1989) enumerate several cases wherein democratic transitions proved to be unsuccessful without the unification of the elite. Latin America has the relatively recent examples, from Colombia, Velenzuela, Chile and Uruguay, all of which experienced democratic breakdowns whose instability stemmed from "fragile coalitions and stalemates among... disunified elites... [whose] duration [is dependent] on... luck" (Higley and Burton, 1989). Elite disunity and government breakdowns in general exist as far back as 19th century Europe, with Norway, Spain, France, Italy, Denmark and Belgium experiencing such a crisis. Higley and Burton (1989) that stability exists only after "elite settlement or a two-step transformation", if not from a colonial legacy. Too bad our colonial legacy preserved a warped form of democracy shaped around client-patron relationships and rent-seeking.

As far as the measure of our democratic nature is going, we seem to be headed to the direction of hollowing out, if not being already there. It doesn't seem as if the elite are doing much to preserve the stability of democracy; the preservation of their interests is clearly above that, in spite of their numerous speeches regarding the value of democracy and what-not. The preservation of democratic stability would require a radical change in our political culture, perhaps, but in the absence of it, the most we can hope for is political stability in general.

- Nina Palisoc

References:
Coronel, S. (2004). The rulemakers: How the wealthy and well-born dominate congress. Quezon City: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism.

Higley, J., and Burton, M. (1989). The elite variable in democratic transitions and breakdowns. American Sociological Review 54 (1): 17-32.

Higley, J., Hoffman-Lange, U., Kadushin, C., and Moore, G. (1991). Elite integration in stable democracies: A reconsideration. European Sociological Review 7 (1): 35-53.

Mills, C. (1956). The power elite. New York: Oxford University Press.

Przeworski, A. (1991). Democracy and the market. Political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Sartori, G. (1987). The theory of democracy revisited 1: The contemporary debate. New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers.